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In his 1980 book Great Planning Disasters,1 Peter
Hall argued that there are two ‘rather different 
but related’ meanings of planning. Firstly, it might
‘refer to a set of processes whereby decision-
makers engage in logical foresight before committing
themselves’ – processes which are ‘common to the
planning of many public activities: defence, economic
development, education, public order and welfare’
and indeed by ‘large private corporations’. Secondly,
the word planning ‘can refer to processes that
result in a physical plan showing the distribution of
activities and their related structures (houses,
factories, offices, schools) in geographical space’,
the kind of planning often described as ‘physical
planning, or town and country planning, or urban
and regional planning’ (or environmental, or spatial
planning).
One of the startling things, among many, about
the period leading up to and since the UK’s 2016 
EU referendum has been the revelation that
departments of UK government did not apparently
engage in any kind of planning for the eventuality 
of a vote to leave the EU.2
Planning for a possible UK exit from the EU might
have most obviously implied a requirement for the
first kind of planning identified by Hall, as a process
of ‘logical foresight’ – for example, planning for
impacts on different sectors of the economy.3 And
while it would be unlikely to involve planning in the
second sense mentioned above, there would have
been scope to consider the effects on different
places (‘in geographical space’, to use Hall’s terms)
– not least as the territorial effects of leaving the 
EU are expected to be varied. However, it seems
that there was little appreciation at the heart of the
UK state of William McDonough’s satisfyingly
circular dictum that ‘planning is most effective when
it is practiced in advance’!
But it is never too late to start planning! After all,
the UK has not actually left the EU yet, and the
Article 50 process allows plenty of time to conduct
preparatory work – the undertaking of impact
assessments (IAs) perhaps? The preparation of the
latter has become customary practice as part of
‘processes whereby decision-makers engage in
logical foresight before committing themselves’ (to
use Hall’s words).
So despite the false start around anticipating and
planning for the impacts of the UK leaving the EU, 
it has been very reassuring to hear David Davis, 
the UK government’s ‘Secretary of State for Exiting
the European Union’, state repeatedly for over a 
year that his ‘Department for Exiting the European
Union’ (DExEU) has been preparing 50-60 studies
on the implications of the UK leaving the EU for
different sectors, and that these contained
‘excruciating detail’.4
Oddly, however, Davis also displayed a marked
reluctance to share these documents with
Parliament, business, and the British people, until a
Labour Party parliamentary motion was passed,
asking him to release the studies to the Exiting the
European Union Select Committee. Subsequently,
on 6 December 2017, in giving evidence before this
committee, he finally admitted that that ‘no such
systematic IAs’5 had been carried out.6 Leaving
aside the issue of why Davis might have sought to
convey an impression over many months that such
studies were being prepared when apparently they
do not exist, his admission was extraordinary.
The kinds of analyses at the heart of the ongoing
controversy around the UK leaving the EU are
routinely prepared in the context of drafting
government policies and were until recently called
regulatory impact assessments. The government
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template which provides a list outlining the purpose
and focus of an impact assessment states that
these should include:
● a description of the problem under consideration;
● the rationale for the intervention;
● the (overall) policy objective;
● a description of options considered (including the
status quo);
● the monetised and non-monetised costs and
benefits of each option (including the
administrative burden);
● the rationale and evidence that justify the level of
analysis used in the IA (proportionality approach);
● risks and assumptions;
● direct costs and benefits to business calculations;
and
● what is referred to as ‘wider impacts’.
With regards to wider impacts, reference is 
made to an IA toolkit, which was released by the
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills in
2011. This document reveals that the approach used
is broadly in line with an internationally accepted
understanding of what IAs should look like. They are
participatory, transparent and open decision support
procedures, consisting of various (logical) steps. The
assessment of different options is at the heart of
such IAs, focusing on various economic and other
impact areas.
The ubiquity of IAs as part of government’s
processes of ‘logical foresight’ perhaps explains
why Davis sought to circumnavigate some of the
select committee’s questions and criticisms by
stating ‘You use the word impact assessment. I’ve
been using the word sectoral analysis. They are
different, right?’ He added that ‘People seem to
assume an impact assessment consists of a
quantitative forecast’ and that issues such as
whether the UK should leave the EU customs union
were also based on ‘a judgment made on qualitative
things, but not a quantitative one’. IAs are indeed
distinctive from purely quantitatively based tools
such as cost/benefit analyses (CBAs) used in various
forms since the mid-19th century in justifying
investment decisions. They emerged in the 1970s
and were initially associated with environmental
impact assessments (EIAs) before being applied in a
multitude of other fields, including health, social
impact studies and sustainable development.7
So if DExEU has not been doing solely
quantitative economic assessments – not least
perhaps as Davis stated he is ‘not a fan of
economic models because they have all proven
wrong’8 – then which other analyses had been
undertaken (in keeping with standard government
practice)? His semantical side-stepping around
‘assessments’ and ‘analyses’ could not obfuscate
the fact that, as the committee chair Hilary Benn
MP suggested, it was strange when ‘the
government undertakes impact assessments on 
all sorts of things all of the time that on the most
fundamental change that we are facing as a 
country you’ve just told us that the Government
hasn’t undertaken any impact assessments at all’.5
Davis’s position, however, was that the usefulness
of any such assessments would be ‘near zero’ 
in the context of the scale of change likely to be
unleashed by the UK leaving the EU. So when
things get very complicated, is any attempt at
logical foresight futile, and should we just hope for
the best? A further insight into the Secretary of
State’s attitude was provided by his subsequent
statement: ‘What’s the requirement of my job? I
don’t have to be very clever, I don’t have to know
that much, I do just have to be calm.’9 So there we
have it – the ‘exiting of the EU and the victory of the
know-nothing school’!10
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Yet given usual practice, and in keeping with the
spirit of ‘logical foresight’ evoked by Peter Hall,
might not comprehensive and participatory IAs help
government to make informed and transparent
decisions about future policy choices, considering
not just the sectoral, but the wider economic,
societal, environmental and spatial impacts of
different options? (Of course, they might also reveal
some awkward truths.)
One issue they might address is the potentially
differential regional effects of leaving the EU – 
given that for some regions economic and other
consequences are likely to be more severe than 
for others.11 In this context, the ‘territorial impact
assessment’ (TIA)12 instruments originally
developed in order to help understand the potential
impacts of EU policies (for example directives and
funding programmes) on different European regions
could play a role.
In the EU context their rationale is connected to
the Treaty objective of promoting territorial cohesion
and the aspiration of fostering every region within
the EU in realising its full potential for long-term
sustainable development. But methodologically TIA
could also be used to assess the impacts on places
of leaving the EU. For example, from a regional
policy perspective, as Kevin Morgan notes, ‘Brexit
raises an issue that dwarfs all others and it is this:
will London provide the same level of support after
2020 that is currently on offer from Brussels?’.13,14
But aside from changes in regional funding
allocations, another impact on places may be the
opportunity costs of diverting scarce resources and
attention from authentic national policy challenges
such as housing, social care and health. These costs
may be high and are likely to impact disproportionately
‘in geographical space’ on those places and
communities that can least afford to bear them.
Given that TIA considers social, economic and
administrative impacts, it may help in assessing
such differential economic, social, environmental,
UK-wide and regional effects of leaving the EU. It
might even help decision-makers and citizens
anticipate with ‘logical foresight’ the impacts and
consequences, to try plan to mitigate these as best
they can, and to develop their resilience in the face
of an uncertain future.15
Conclusion
Peter Hall defined a planning disaster as ‘any
planning process that is perceived by many people
to have gone wrong’. It is certainly sobering to
consider the governmental handling of the EU
referendum and its aftermath from this perspective.
Hall also noted that, in some of the cases covered
in Great Planning Disasters, even if the ‘outcome
might not have been very different’, better planning
may have meant that ‘in all, the decision would have
been taken more consciously, more rationally, with
greater knowledge of likely consequences, and in
the last resort more democratically’.
However, Taylor and Hurley also note the human
‘propensity to unconsciously reimagine information
to fit our own theories and existing worldviews’ and
how ‘when we lack information, we default to these
views’, adding that ‘even if the implications of new
information challenge an existing idea, it will be
reimagined of discarded’.15
The cognitive bias of decision-makers and
populations may thus mean that more knowledge 
of the impacts of leaving the EU may not shift
opinions. Despite this, might we dare to hope that
more awareness of the potential impacts and trade-
offs of leaving the EU may contribute to creating
better-informed decision-makers and citizens, and in
this ultimately enhances the democratic quality of
ongoing deliberation about choices and outcomes?
After all, David Davis has stated: ‘If a democracy
cannot change its mind, it ceases to be a
democracy.’
Yet given the manner in which the prospect of
leaving the EU has been planned for, those such as
Davis who have willed this fate on the nation would 
do well to remember Peter Hall’s closing words 
in 1980: ‘There may be some excuses for great
planning disasters, but there are not nearly as many
as we think’. 
● Dr Olivier Sykes and Professor Thomas B Fischer are 
with the Environmental Assessment and Management
Research Centre in the Department of Geography and
Planning at the University of Liverpool. The views expressed
are personal.
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‘Might we dare to hope that
more awareness of the
potential impacts and trade-
offs of leaving the EU may
contribute to creating better-
informed decision-makers and
citizens, and in this ultimately
enhances the democratic
quality of ongoing deliberation
about choices and outcomes?’
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